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Abstract
In this paper we study a continuous time equilibrium model of limit order book (LOB)
in which the liquidity dynamics follows a non-local, reflected mean-field stochastic differential
equation (SDE) with evolving intensity. Generalizing the basic idea of [33], we argue that the
frontier of the LOB (e.g., the best asking price) is the value function of a mean-field stochastic
control problem, as the limiting version of a Bertrand-type competition among the liquidity
providers. With a detailed analysis on the N -seller static Bertrand game, we formulate a
continuous time limiting mean-field control problem of the representative seller. We then
validate the dynamic programming principle (DPP), and show that the value function is a
viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We argue
that the value function can be used to obtain the equilibrium density function of the LOB,
following the idea of [33].
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1
1 Introduction
With the rapid growth of electronic trading, the study of order-driven markets has become an
increasingly prominent focus in quantitative finance. Indeed, in the current financial world more
than half of the markets use a limit order book (LOB) mechanism to facilitate trade. There
has been a large amount of literature studying LOB from various angles, combined with some
associated optimization problems such as placement, liquidation, executions, etc. (see, e.g. [1],
[3], [4], [5], [7], [15], [19], [21], [31], [36], [37], [40], to mention a few). Among many important
structural issues of LOB, one of the focuses has been the dynamic movement of the LOB, both
its frontier and its “density” (or “shape”). The latter was shown to be a determining factor of
the “liquidity cost” (cf. [33]), an important aspect that impacts the pricing of the asset. We refer
to, e.g., [2, 20, 27, 33] for the study of LOB particularly concerning its shape formation.
In this paper, we try to extend dynamic model of LOB proposed in [33] in two major aspects.
The guiding idea is to specify the expected equilibrium utility function, which plays an essential
role in the modeling of the shape of the LOB in that it endogenously determines both the dynamic
density of the LOB and its frontier. More precisely, instead of assuming, more or less in an ad hoc
manner, that the equilibrium price behaves like an “utility function”, we shall consider it as the
consequence of a Bertrand-type game among a large number of liquidity providers (sellers who
set limit orders). Following the argument of [14], we first study an N -seller static Bertrand game,
each with a profit function involving not only the limit order price less the waiting cost, the same
criterion as that in [33], but also the average of the other sellers limit orders observed. We show
that the Nash equilibrium exists in such a game. With an easy randomization argument, we can
then show that, as N → ∞, the Nash equilibrium converges to an optimal strategy of a single
player’s optimization problem with a mean-field nature, as expected.
We note that the Bertrand game in finance can be traced back to as early as 1800s, when
Cournot [16] and Bertrand [8] first studied oligopoly models of markets with a small number
of competitive players. We refer to Friedman [18] and Vives [42] for background and references.
Since Cournot’s model uses quantities as a strategic variable to determine the price, while Bertrand
model does the opposition, we choose to use the Bertrand game as it fits our problem better. We
shall assume that the sellers use the same marginal profit function, but with different choices
of the price-waiting cost preference to achieve the optimal outcome (see §3 for more detailed
formulation). We would like to point out that our study of Bertrand game is in a sense “moti-
vational” for the second main feature of this paper, that is, the continuous time, mean-field type
dynamic liquidity model. More precisely, we assume that the liquidity dynamics is a pure-jump
Markov process, with a mean-field type state dependent jump intensity. Such a dynamic game
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is rather complicated, and is expected to involve systems of nonlinear, mean-field type partial
differential equations (see, e.g., [24, 28]). We therefore consider the limiting case as the number
of sellers tends to infinity, and argue that the dynamics of the total liquidity should follow a pure
jump Markov process with a mean-field type intensity, and can be expressed as the solution of a
pure-jump SDE with reflecting boundary conditions and mean-field type state-dependent jump
intensity. We note that such SDE is itself new and therefore interesting in its own right.
We should point out that the special features of our underlying liquidity dynamics (mean-field
type; state-dependent intensity; and reflecting boundary conditions) require the combined techni-
cal tools in mean-field games, McKean-Vlasov SDEs with state-dependent jump intensities, and
SDEs with discontinuous paths and reflecting boundary conditions. In particular, we refer to the
works [11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 30, 32, 34] (and the references cited therein) for the technical founda-
tion of this paper. Furthermore, apart from justifying the underlying liquidity dynamics, another
main task of this paper is to substantiate the corresponding stochastic control problem, including
validating the dynamic programming principle (DPP) and showing that the value function is a
viscosity solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation.
This paper is organized as follows. In §2 we introduce necessary notations and preliminary
concepts, and study the well-posedness of a reflected mean-field SDEs with jumps that will be
essential in our study. We shall also provide an Itoˆ’s formula involving reflected mean-field SDEs
with jumps for ready reference. In §3 we investigate a static Bertrand game with N sellers, and its
limiting behavior as N tends to infinity. Based on the results, we then propose in §4 a continuous
time mean-field type stochastic control problem for a representative seller, as the limiting version
of dynamic Bertrand game when the number of sellers becomes sufficiently large. In §5 and §6 we
prove the dynamic programming principle (DPP), derive the HJB equation, and show that the
value function is a viscosity solution to the corresponding HJB equation. Finally, in §7 we make
some concluding remarks regarding how the value function is related to the equilibrium density
of the LOB, following the arguments in [33].
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space on which is defined two
standard Brownian motions W = {Wt : t ≥ 0} and B = {Bt : t ≥ 0}. Let (A,BA) and
(B,BB) be two measurable spaces. We assume that there are two Poisson random measures
N s and N b, defined on R+ ×A × R+ and R+ × B, and with Le´vy measures νs(dz) and νb(dz),
respectively. In other words, we assume that the Poisson measuresN s andN b have mean measures
N̂ s(·) := m × νs ×m(·) and N̂ b(·) := m × νb(·), respectively, where m(·) denotes the Lebesgue
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measure on R+, and we denote the compensated random measures N˜ s(A) := (N s − N̂ s)(A) =
N s(A) − (m × νs × m)(A) and N˜ b(B) := (N b − N̂ b)(B) = N b(B) − (m × νb)(B), for any
A ∈ B(R+×A×R+) and B ∈ B(R+×B). For simplicity, throughout this paper we assume that
both νs and νb are finite, that is, νs(A), νb(B) < ∞, and we assume the Brownian motions and
Poisson random measures are mutually independent. We note that for any A ∈ B(A× R+) and
B ∈ B(B), the processes (t, ω) 7→ N˜ s([0, t]×A,ω), N˜ b([0, t]×B,ω) are both FN s,N b-martingales.
Here FN
s,N b denotes the filtration generated by N s and N b.
For a generic Euclidean space E and for T > 0, we denote C([0, T ];E) and D([0, T ];E) to be
the spaces of continuous and ca`dla`g functions, respectively. We endow both spaces with “sup-
norms”, so that both of them are complete metric spaces. Next, for p ≥ 1 we denote Lp(F ;E)
to be the space of all E-valued F-measurable random variable ξ defined on the probability space
(Ω,F ,P) such that E[|ξ|p] < ∞. In particular, L2(F ;R) is a Hilbert space with inner product
(ξ, η)2 = E[ξη], ξ, η ∈ L2(F ;R), and a norm ‖ξ‖2 = (ξ, ξ)1/22 . Also, we denote LpF([t, T ];E) to be
all E-valued F-adapted process η on [t, T ], such that ‖η‖p,T := E[
∫ T
t |ηs|pds]1/p < ∞. We often
use the notations Lp(F;C([0, T ];E)) and Lp(F;D([0, T ];E)) when we need to specify the path
properties for elements in Lp
F
([0, T ];E).
For p ≥ 1 we denote by Pp(E) the space of probability measures µ on (E,B(E)) with finite
p-th moment, i.e. ‖µ‖pp :=
∫
E |x|pµ(dx) < ∞. Clearly, for ξ ∈ Lp(F ;E), the law L(ξ) = Pξ :=
P ◦ ξ−1 ∈ Pp(E). We endow Pp(E) with the following p-Wasserstein metric:
Wp(µ, ν) := inf
{(∫
E×E
|x− y|ppi(dx, dy)
) 1
p
: pi ∈ Pp(E × E) with marginals µ and ν
}
= inf
{
‖ξ − ξ′‖Lp(Ω) : ξ, ξ′ ∈ Lp(F ;E) with Pξ = µ, Pξ′ = ν
}
. (2.1)
Furthermore, we suppose that there is a sub-σ-algebra G ⊂ F such that (i) the Brownian
motionW and Poisson random measures N s,N b are independent of G; and (ii) G is “rich enough”
in the sense that for every µ ∈ P2(R), there is a random variable ξ ∈ L2(G;E) such that µ = Pξ.
Let F = FW,B,N
s,N b∨G = {Ft}t≥0, where Ft = FWt ∨FBt ∨FN st ∨FN bt ∨G, t ≥ 0, be the filtration
generated by W , B, N s, N b, and G, augmented by all the P-null sets so that it satisfies the usual
hypotheses (cf. [39]).
The following notation of “differentiability” with respect to probability measures is based on
the lecture notes [11] following the course at Colle´ge de France by P. L. Lions.For a function
f : P2(R) → R, we introduce a “lift” function f ♯ : L2(F ;R) → R such that f ♯(ξ) := f(Pξ), ξ ∈
L2(F ;R). Clearly f ♯ depends only on the law of ξ ∈ L2(F ;R), and is independent of the choice
of the representative ξ. We say that f : P2(R)→ R is differentiable at µ0 ∈ P2(R) if there exists
ξ0 ∈ L2(F ;R) with Pξ0 = µ0 such that f ♯ is Fre´chet differentiable at ξ0. In other words, there
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exists a continuous linear functional Df ♯(ξ0) : L
2(F ;R)→ R such that
f ♯(ξ0 + η)− f ♯(ξ0) = Df ♯(ξ0)(η) + o(‖η‖2). (2.2)
We shall denote Dηf(µ0) = Df
♯(ξ0)(η), and refer to it as the Fre´chet derivative of f at µ0
in the direction η. By Riesz’ Representation Theorem, there exists a unique random variable
ζ ∈ L2(F ;R) such that Dηf(µ0) = Df ♯(ξ0)(η) = (ζ, η)2 = E[ζη], η ∈ L2(F ;R). It was shown in
[11, Lemma 3.2] that there exists a Borel function h[µ0] : R→ R, which depends only on the law
µ0 = Pξ0 but not on the particular choice of the representative ξ0, such that ζ = h[µ0](ξ0), P-a.s..
We shall denote ∂µf(Pξ0 , y) , h[µ0](y), y ∈ R and refer to it the derivative of f : P2(R) → R at
µ0 = Pξ0 . In other words, we have the following identities:
Df ♯(ξ0) = ζ = h[Pξ0 ](ξ0) = ∂µf(Pξ0 , ξ0), (2.3)
and (2.2) can be rewritten as
f(Pξ0+η)− f(Pξ0) = E[h[Pξ0 ](ξ0)η] + o(‖η‖2) = (∂µf(Pξ0 , ξ0), η)2 + o(‖η‖2), (2.4)
and Dηf(Pξ0) = (∂µf(Pξ0 , ξ0), η)2 where η = ξ − ξ0. Notice that ∂µf(Pξ0 , y) is only Pξ0(dy)-a.e.
uniquely determined.
Let us introduce two spaces that are useful for our analysis later. We denote C1,1b (P2(R))
the space of all differentiable functions f : P2(R)→ R such that ∂µf exists, and is bounded and
Lipschitz continuous. That is, for some constant C > 0, it holds
(i) |∂µf(µ, x)| ≤ C, µ ∈ P2(R), x ∈ R;
(ii) |∂µf(µ, x)− ∂µf(µ′, x′)| ≤ C{|x− x′|+W2(µ, µ′)}, µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R), x, x′ ∈ R.
Note that if f ∈ C1,1b (P2(R)), then for fixed y ∈ R, we can discuss the differentiability of the
derivative function ∂µf(·, y) : P2(R) → R. In particular, if ∂µf(·, y) ∈ C1,1b (P2(R)) again, then
for every y ∈ R, we can define
∂2µf(µ, x, y) := ∂µ((∂µf)(·, y))(µ, x), (µ, x, y) ∈ P2(R)× R× R. (2.5)
We shall denote C2,1b (P2(R)) to be the space of all functions f ∈ C1,1b (P2(R)) such that
(i) ∂µf(·, x) ∈ C1,1b (P2(R)) for all x ∈ R;
(ii) ∂2µf : P2(R)× R× R→ R⊗ R is bounded and Lipschitz continuous;
(iii) ∂µf(µ, ·) : R → R is differentiable for every µ ∈ P2(R), and its derivative ∂y∂µf :
P2(R)× R→ R⊗ R is bounded and Lipschitz continuous.
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2.1 Mean-field SDEs with reflecting boundary conditions
In this subsection we consider the following (discontinuous) SDE with reflection: for t ∈ [0, T ),
Xs = x+
∫ s
t
∫
A×R+
θ(r,Xr−,PXr , z)1[0,λ(r,Xr−,PXr )](y)N˜ s(drdzdy) (2.6)
+
∫ s
t
b(r,Xr,PXr)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xr ,PXr)dBr + βs +Ks, s ∈ [t, T ],
where θ, λ, b, σ are measurable functions defined on appropriate subspaces of [0, T ] × Ω × R ×
P2(R)×R, β is an F-adapted process with ca`dla`g paths, and K is a “reflecting process”, that is,
it is an F-adapted, non-decreasing, ca`dla`g process, so that
(i) Xs ≥ 0, P-a.s.;
(ii)
∫ T
0 1{Xr>0}dK
c
r = 0, P-a.s. (K
c denotes the continuous part of K); and
(iii) ∆Kt = (Xt− +∆Yt)
−, where Y = X −K.
We call SDE (2.6) a mean-field SDE with discontinuous paths and reflections (MFSDEDR),
and we denote the solution by (Xt,x,Kt,x), although the superscript is often omitted when context
is clear. If b, σ = 0 and β is pure jump, then the solution (X,K) becomes pure jump as well (i.e.,
dKc ≡ 0). We note that the main feature of this SDE is that the jump intensity λ(· · · ) of the
solution X is “state-dependent” with mean-field nature. Its well-posedness thus requires some
attention since, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been studied in the literature.
We shall make use of the following Standing Assumptions.
Assumption 2.1. The mappings λ : [0, T ]×R×P2(R) 7→ R+, b : [0, T ]×Ω×R×P2(R) 7→ R,
σ : [0, T ]×Ω×R×P2(R) 7→ R, and θ : [0, T ]×Ω×R×P2(R)×R 7→ R are all uniformly bounded
and continuous in (t, x), and satisfy the following conditions, respectively:
(i) For fixed µ ∈ P2(R) and x, z ∈ R, the mappings (t, ω) 7→ θ(t, ω, x, µ, z), (b, σ)(t, ω, x, µ)
are F-predictable;
(ii) For fixed µ ∈ P2(R), (t, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R, and P-a.e ω ∈ Ω, the functions λ(t, ·, µ),
b(t, ω, ·, µ), σ(t, ω, ·, µ), θ(t, ω, ·, µ, z) ∈ C1b (R);
(iii) For fixed (t, x, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R2, and P-a.e ω ∈ Ω, the functions λ(t, x, ·), b(t, ω, x, ·),
σ(t, ω, x, ·), θ(t, ω, x, ·, z) ∈ C1,1b (P2(R));
(iv) There exists L > 0, such that for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, it holds that
|λ(t, x, µ) − λ(t, x′, µ′)|+ |b(t, ω, x, µ)− b(t, ω, x′, µ′)|
+|σ(t, ω, x, µ) − σ(t, ω, x′, µ′)|+ |θ(t, ω, x, µ, z) − θ(t, ω, x′, µ′, z)|
≤ L (|x− x′|+W1(µ, µ′)) , t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′, z ∈ R, µ, µ′ ∈ P2(R).
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Remark 2.2. (i) The requirements on the coefficients in Assumption 2.1 (such as boundedness)
are stronger than necessary, only to simplify the arguments. More general (but standard) as-
sumptions using, e.g., the L2-integrability with respect to the Le´vy measure ν (even in the case
when ν(R) = ∞) are easily extendable without substantial difficulties. We prefer not to pursue
such generality since this is not the main purpose of the paper.
(ii) Throughout this paper, unless specified, we shall denote C > 0 to be a generic constant
depending only on T , ν(R), and bounds in Assumption 2.1. Furthermore, we shall allow it to
vary from line to line.
It is well-known that (see, e.g., [10]), as a mean-field SDE, the solution to (2.6) may not satisfy
the so-called “flow property”, in the sense that Xt,xr 6= Xs,X
t,x
s
r , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ r ≤ T . It is also noted
in [10] that if we consider the following accompanying SDE of (2.6):
Xt,ξs = ξ +
∫ s
t
∫
A×R+
θ(r,Xt,ξr−,PXt,ξr
, z)1
[0,λ(r,Xt,ξr−,PXt,ξr
)]
(y)N˜ s(drdzdy) (2.7)
+
∫ s
t
b(r,Xt,ξr ,PXt,ξr
)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,ξr ,PXt,ξr
)dBr + βs +K
t,ξ
s , s ∈ [t, T ],
and then using the law PXt,ξ to consider a slight variation of (2.7):
Xt,x,ξs = x+
∫ s
t
∫
A×R+
θ(r,Xt,x,ξr− ,PXt,ξr
, z)1
[0,λ(r,Xt,x,ξr− ,PXt,ξr
)]
(y)N˜ s(drdzdy) (2.8)
+
∫ s
t
b(r,Xt,x,ξr ,PXt,ξr
)dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,x,ξr ,PXt,ξr
)dBr + βs +K
t,x,ξ
s , s ∈ [t, T ],
where ξ ∈ L2(Ft;R), then we shall argue below that the following flow property holds:(
Xs,X
t,x,ξ
s ,X
t,ξ
s
r ,X
s,Xt,ξs
r
)
= (Xt,x,ξr ,X
t,ξ
r ), 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ r ≤ T, (2.9)
for all (x, ξ) ∈ R× L2(Ft;R). We should note that although both SDEs (2.7) and (2.8) resemble
the original equation (2.6), the process Xt,x,ξ has the full information of the solution given the
initial data (x, ξ), where ξ provides the initial distribution Pξ, and x is the actual initial state.
To prove the well-posedness of SDEs (2.7) and (2.8), we first recall the so-called “Discontinuous
Skorohod Problem” (DSP) (see, e.g., [17, 32]). Let Y ∈ D([0, T ]), Y0 ≥ 0. We say that a pair
(X,K) ∈ D([0, T ])2 is a solution to the DSP(Y ) if
(i) X = Y +K;
(ii) Xt ≥ 0, t ≥ 0; and
(iii) K is nondecreasing, K0 = 0, and Kt =
∫ t
0 1{Xs−=0}dKs, t ≥ 0.
It is well-known that the solution to DSP exists and is unique, and it can be shown (see
[32]) that the condition (iii) amounts to saying that
∫ t
0 1{Xs−>0}dK
c
s = 0, where K
c denotes the
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continuous part of K, and ∆Kt = (Xt− +∆Yt)
−. Furthermore, it is shown in [17] that solution
mapping of the DSP, Γ : D([0, T ]) 7→ D([0, T ]), defined by Γ(Y ) = X, is Lipschitz continuous
under uniform topology. That is, there exists a constant L > 0 such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Γ(Y 1)t − Γ(Y 2)t| ≤ L sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y 1t − Y 2t |, Y 1, Y 2 ∈ D([0, T ]). (2.10)
Before we proceed to prove the well-posedness of (2.7) and (2.8), we note that the two SDEs
can be argued separately. Moreover, while (2.7) is a mean-field (or McKean-Vlasov)-type of SDE,
(2.8) is actually a standard SDE (although with state-dependent intensity) with discontinuous
paths and reflection, given the law of the solution to (2.7), PXt,ξ , and it can be argued similarly
but much simpler. Therefore, in what follows we shall focus only on the well-posedness of SDE
(2.7). Furthermore, for simplicity we shall assume b ≡ 0, as the general case can be argued
similarly without substantial difficulty.
The scheme of solving the SDE (2.7) is more or less standard (see, e.g., [32]). We shall first
consider an SDE without reflection: for ξ ∈ L2(Ft;R) and s ∈ [t, T ],
Y t,ξs = ξ +
∫ s
t
∫
A×R+
θ(r,Γ(Y t,ξ)r−,PΓ(Y t,ξ)r , z)1[0,λΓ(t,ξ)r− ]
(y)N˜ s(drdzdy) (2.11)
+
∫ s
t
σ(r,Γ(Y t,ξ)r,PΓ(Y t,ξ)r )dBr + βs,
where λ
Γ(t,ξ)
r− := λ(r,Γ(Y
t,ξ)r−,PΓ(Y t,ξ)r). Clearly, if we can show that (2.11) is well-posed, then
by simply setting Xt,ξs = Γ(Y t,ξ)s and K
t,ξ
s = X
t,ξ
s − Y t,ξs , s ∈ [t, T ], we see that (Xt,ξ ,Kt,ξ)
would solve SDE (2.7)(!). We should note that a technical difficulty caused by the presence of
the state-dependent intensity is that the usual L2-norm does not work as naturally as expected,
as we shall see below. We nevertheless have the following result.
Theorem 2.3. Assume that Assumptions 2.1 is in force. Then, there exists a solution Y t,ξ ∈
L2
F
(D([t, T ])) to SDE (2.11). Furthermore, such solution is pathwisely unique.
Proof. Assume t = 0. For a given T0 > 0, and y ∈ L1F(D([0, T0])), consider a mapping T :
T (y)s := ξ +
∫ s
0
∫
A×R+
θ(r,Γ(y)r−,PΓ(y)r , z)1[0,λ(r,Γ(y)r− ,PΓ(y)r)](u)N˜ s(drdzdu) (2.12)
+
∫ s
0
σ(r,Γ(y)r ,PΓ(y)r)dBr + βs, s ≥ 0.
We shall argue that T is a contraction mapping on L1
F
(D([0, T0])) for T0 > 0 small enough.
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To see this, denote, for η ∈ D([0, T0]), |η|∗s := sup0≤r≤s |ηr|, and define θs(z) := θ(s,Γ(y)s,PΓ(y)s , z),
λs := λ(s,Γ(y)s,PΓ(y)s), σs := σ(s,Γ(y)s,PΓ(y)s), s ∈ [0, T0]. Then, we have
E[|T (y)|∗T0 ] ≤ C
{
E|ξ|+ E
[ ∫ T0
0
∫
A×R+
∣∣θr(z)1[0,λr ](y))∣∣νs(dz)dydr] + E[(
∫ T0
0
|σr|2dr
)1/2]}
≤ CE|ξ|+ CE
[ ∫ T0
0
∫
A
|θr(z)λr|νs(dz)dr
]
+ CE
[(∫ T0
0
|σr|2dr
)1/2]
<∞,
thanks to Assumption 2.1. Hence, T (y) ∈ L1
F
(D([0, T0])).
We now show that T is a contraction on L1
F
(D([0, T0])). For y1, y2 ∈ L1F(D([0, T0])), we
denote θi, λi, and σi, respectively, as before, and denote ∆ϕ := ϕ1 − ϕ2, for ϕ = θ, λ, σ, and
∆T (s) = T (y1)s −T (y2)s, s ≥ 0. Then, we have, for s ∈ [0, T0],
∆T (s) =
∫ s
0
∫
A×R+
[
∆θr(z)1[0,λ1r ](y) + θ
2
r(z)(1[0,λ1r ](y)− 1[0,λ2r ](y))
] N˜ s(drdzdy) + ∫ s
0
∆σrdBr.
Clearly, ∆T = T (y1) − T (y2) is a martingale on [0, T0]. Since N˜ = N − N̂ and |1[0,a](·) −
1[0,b](·)| ≤ 1[a∧b,a∨b](·) for any a, b ∈ R, we have, for 0 ≤ s ≤ T0,
E|∆T |∗s ≤ 2E
[ ∫ s
0
∫
A×R+
∣∣∆θr(z)1[0,λ1r ](y) + θ2r(z)(1[0,λ1r ](y)− 1[0,λ2r ](y))∣∣νs(dz)dydr]
+E
[(∫ s
0
|∆σr|2dr
) 1
2
]
:= I1 + I2. (2.13)
Recalling from Remark 2.2-(ii) for the generic constant C > 0, and by Assumption 2.1-(iv), (2.10),
and the definition of W1(·, ·) (see (2.1)), we have
I1 ≤ C
{
E
[ ∫ s
0
∫
A
|∆θr(z)|νs(dz)dr
]
+ E
[ ∫ s
0
|∆λr|dr
]}
≤ CE
[ ∫ s
0
[|Γ(y1)r − Γ(y2)r|+W1(PΓ(y1)r ,PΓ(y2)r)]dr
]
≤ CE
[ ∫ s
0
|Γ(y1)− Γ(y2)|∗rdr
]
≤ CT0‖y1 − y2‖L1(D([0,T0])), (2.14)
I2 ≤ CE
[(∫ s
0
{|y1 − y2|∗,2r +W1(PΓ(y1)r ,PΓ(y2)r)2}dr
)1/2]
≤ CE[√s(|y1 − y2|∗s + E|y1 − y2|∗s)] ≤ C√T0‖y1 − y2‖L1(D([0,T0])).
Combining (2.13) and (2.14), we deduce that
‖∆T ‖L1(D([0,T0])) ≤ C(T0 +
√
T0)‖y1 − y2‖L1(D([0,T0])), s ∈ [0, T0]. (2.15)
Therefore, by choosing T0 such that C(T0+
√
T0) < 1, we see that the mapping T is a contraction
on L1(D([0, T0])), which implies that (2.11) has a unique solution in L
1
F
(D([0, T0])). Moreover,
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we note that T0 depends only on the universal constants in Assumption 2.1. We can repeat
the argument for the time interval [T0, 2T0], [2T0, 3T0], · · · , and conclude that (2.11) has a unique
solution in L1
F
(D([0, T ])) for any given T > 0.
Finally, we claim that the solution Y ∈ L2
F
(D([0, T ])). Indeed, by Burkholder-Davis-Gundy’s
inequality and Assumption 2.1, we have
E[|Y |∗,2s ] ≤ C
{
E|ξ|2 + E
[ ∫ s
0
∫
A×R+
∣∣θr(z)1[0,λr ](y))∣∣2νs(dz)dydr] + E[
∫ s
0
|σr|2dr] + E|β|∗,2T
}
≤ C
{
E|ξ|2 + E
[ ∫ s
0
[
1 + |Yr|2 +W1(0,Γ(Y )r)
]2
dr
]
+ E|β|∗,2T
}
(2.16)
≤ C
{
E|ξ|2 +
∫ s
0
(1 + E[|Y |∗,2r ])dr + E|β|∗,2T
}
, s ∈ [0, T ].
Here, in the last inequality above we used the fact that
W1(0,Γ(Y )r)
2 ≤ (‖Γ(Y )r‖L1(Ω))2 ≤ (E|Γ(Y )|∗r)2 ≤ CE[|Y |∗,2r ], r ∈ [0, s].
Applying the Gronwall inequality, we obtain that E[|Y |∗,2T ] <∞. The proof is now complete.
Remark 2.4. (i) It is worth noting that once we solved Xt,ξ, then we know PXt,ξ , and (2.8) can
be viewed as a standard SDEDR with coefficient λ˜(s, x) := λ(s, x,P
Xt,ξs
), which is Lipschitz in x.
This guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution (Xt,x,ξ,Kt,x,ξ) to (2.8).
(ii) The uniqueness of the solutions to (2.7) and (2.8) implies that Xt,x,ξs |x=ξ= Xt,ξs , s ∈ [t, T ].
That is, Xt,x,ξs |x=ξ solves the same SDE as Xt,ξs , s ∈ [t, T ]. (See more detail in [35])
(iii) Given (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, if Pξ1 = Pξ2 for ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ft;R), then Xt,x,ξ1 and Xt,x,ξ2 are
indistinguishable. So, Xt,x,Pξ := Xt,x,ξ, i.e. Xt,x,ξ depends on ξ only through its law.
2.2 An Itoˆ’s formula
We shall now present an Itoˆ’s formula that will be frequently used in our future discussion. We
note that a similar formula for mean-field SDE can be found in [10], and the one involving jumps
was given in the recent work [23]. The one presented below is a slight modification of that of [23],
taking the particular state-dependent intensity feature of the dynamics into account. Since the
proof is more or less standard but quite lengthy, we refer to [35] for the details.
In what follows we let (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) be a copy of the probability space (Ω,F ,P), and denote E˜[·]
to be the expectation under P˜. For any random variable ϑ defined on (Ω,F ,P), we denote, when
there is no danger of confusion, ϑ˜ ∈ (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) to be a copy of ϑ such that P˜ϑ˜ = Pϑ. We note that
that E˜[·] acts only on the variables of the form ϑ˜.
We first define the following classes of functions.
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Definition 2.5. We say that F ∈ C1,2,(2,1)b ([0, T ] × R× R×P2(R)), if
(i) F (t, v, ·, ·) ∈ C2,1b (R ×P2(R)), for all t ∈ [0, T ] and v ∈ R;
(ii) F (·, v, x, µ) ∈ C1b ([0, T ]), for all (v, x, µ) ∈ R× R×P2(R);
(iii) F (t, ·, x, µ) ∈ C2b (R), for all (t, x, µ) ∈ [0, T ]× R×P2(R);
(iv) All derivatives involved in the definitions above are uniformly bounded over [0, T ] × R ×
R×P2(R) and Lipschitz in (x, µ), uniformly with respect to t.
We are now ready to state the Itoˆ’s formula. Let V t,v be an Itoˆ process given by
V t,vs = v +
∫ s
t
bV (r, V t,vr )dr +
∫ s
t
σV (r, V t,vr )dB
V
r (2.17)
where v ∈ R and (BVt )t∈[0,T ] is a standard Brownian motion independent of (Bt)t∈[0,T ]. For
notational simplicity, in what follows for the coefficients ϕ = b, σ, β, λ, we denote ϕt,x,ξs :=
ϕ(s,Xt,x,ξs ,PXt,ξs
), θt,x,ξs (z) := θ(s,X
t,x,ξ
s ,PXt,ξs
, z), ϕ˜t,ξs := ϕ(s, X˜
t,ξ˜
s ,PXt,ξs
), and θ˜t,ξs (z) := θ(s, X˜
t,ξ˜
s ,
P
Xt,ξs
, z). Similarly, denote bt,vs := bV (s, V
t,v
s ) and σ
t,v
s := σV (s, V
t,v
s ). Also, let us write Θts :=
(s, V t,vs ,X
t,x,ξ
s ,PXt,ξs
). Then Θtt = (t, v, x,Pξ).
Proposition 2.6 (Itoˆ’s Formula). Let Φ ∈ C1,2,(2,1)b ([0, T ]×R×R×P2(R)), and (Xt,ξ ,Xt,x,ξ, V t,v)
be the solutions to (2.7), (2.8) and (2.17), respectively, on [t, T ]. Then, for 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , it
holds that
Φ(Θts)−Φ(Θtt)
=
∫ s
t
(
∂tΦ(Θ
t
r) + ∂xΦ(Θ
t
r)b
t,x,ξ
r +
1
2
∂2xxΦ(Θ
t
r)(σ
t,x,ξ
r )
2 + ∂vΦ(Θ
t
r)b
t,v
r +
1
2
∂2vvΦ(Θ
t
r)(σ
t,v
r )
2
)
dr
+
∫ s
t
∂xΦ(Θ
t
r)σ
t,x,ξ
r dBr +
∫ s
t
∂vΦ(Θ
t
r)σ
t,v
r dB
V
r +
∫ s
t
∂xΦ(Θ
t
r−)1{Xr−=0}dKr (2.18)
+
∫ s
t
∫
A
(
Φ(r, V t,vr ,X
t,x,ξ
r− + θ
t,x,ξ
r (z),PXt,ξr
)− Φ(Θtr−)− ∂xΦ(Θtr−)θt,x,ξr− (z)
)
λt,x,ξr ν
s(dz)dr
+
∫ s
t
∫
A×R+
{
Φ(r, V t,vr ,X
t,x,ξ
r− + θ
t,x,ξ
r (z),PXt,ξr
)− Φ(Θtr−)
}
1
[0,λt,x,ξr ]
(y)N˜ s(drdzdy)
+
∫ s
t
E˜
[
∂µΦ(Θ
t
r, X˜
t,ξ˜
r )b˜
t,ξ
r +
1
2
∂y(∂µΦ)(Θ
t
r, X˜
t,ξ˜
r )(σ˜
t,ξ
r )
2
+
∫ 1
0
∫
A
[∂µΦ(Θ
t
r, X˜
t,ξ˜
r +ρθ˜
t,x,ξ
r (z))−∂µΦ(Θtr, X˜t,ξ˜s )]θ˜t,ξr (z)λ˜t,ξr νs(dz)dρ
]
dr.
3 A Bertrand game among the sellers (static case)
In this section we analyze a price setting mechanism among liquidity providers (investors placing
sell limit orders), which will be used as the basis for our continuous time model in the rest of
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the paper. Following the ideas of [14, 28, 29], we shall consider this process of the (static) price
setting as a Bertrand-type of game among the sellers, each placing a certain number of sell limit
orders at a specific price, and trying to maximize her expected utility. To be more precise, we
assume that sellers use the price at which they place limit orders as their strategic variable, and
the number of shares submitted would be determined accordingly. Furthermore, we assume that
there is a waiting cost, also as a function of the price. Intuitively, a higher price will lead to a
longer execution time, hence a higher waiting cost. Thus, there is a competitive game among the
sellers for better total reward. Finally, we assume that the sellers are homogeneous in the sense
that they have the same subjective probability measure, so that they share the same degree of
risk aversion (or uncertainty aversion).
We now give a brief description of the problem. We assume that there areN sellers, and the jth
seller places limit orders at price pj = X+ lj , j = 1, 2, · · · , N , where X is the mid price. Without
loss of generality, we may assume X = 0. As a main element in an oligopolistic competitions (cf.
e.g., [29]), we assume that there exists a demand function, denoted by hNi (p1, p2, · · · , pN ) for each
seller i, at a given price vector p = (p1, p2, · · · , pN ) at the moment. We note that the number of
shares of limit orders the seller i places in the LOB will be determined by the value of her demand
function with the given price vector, hence a Bertrand game.1 More specifically, we assume that
the demand functions hNi , i = 1, 2, · · · , N , are smooth and satisfy the following properties:
∂hNi
∂pi
< 0, and
∂hNi
∂pj
> 0, for j 6= i. (3.1)
We note that (3.1) amounts to saying that the number of shares each seller places is decreasing
in the seller’s own price and increasing in the other sellers’ price. Furthermore, we shall assume
that the demand functions are invariant under permutations of the other sellers’ prices, in the
sense that, for fixed p1, · · · , pN and all i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N},
hNi (p1, · · · , pi, · · · , pj, · · · , pN ) = hNj (p1, · · · , pj , · · · , pi, · · · , pN ). (3.2)
It is worth noting that the combination of (3.1) and (3.2) is the following fact: if a price vector p
is ordered by p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pN , then by (3.1) and (3.2), for any i < j, it holds that
hNj (p) = h
N
i (p1, · · · , pj, · · · , pi, · · · , pN ) ≤ hNi (p1, · · · , pi, · · · , pi, · · · , pN ) ≤ hNi (p). (3.3)
That is, the demand functions are ordered in a reversed way. Finally, for each i, we denote the
price vector for “other” prices for seller i by p−i, and we assume that there is a “least favorable”
1A Cournot game is one such that the price pi is the function of the numbers of shares q = (q1, · · · , qN ) through
a demand function. The two games are often exchangeable if the demand functions are invertible (see, e.g., [29]).
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price for seller i, denoted by pˆi(p−i) <∞, in the sense that
hNi (p1, · · · , pi−1, pˆi, pi+1, · · · , pN ) = 0. (3.4)
The price pˆi is often called the choke price. We note that the existence of such price, together
with the monotonicity property (3.1), indicates the possibility that hNj (p) < 0, for some j and
some price vector p. But, on the other hand, since the size of order placement cannot be negative,
such scenario becomes unpractical. To amend this, we introduce the notion of actual demand,
denoted by {ĥi(p)}, which we now describe.
Consider an ordered price vector p = (p1, · · · , pN ), with pi ≤ pj, i ≤ j, and we look at hNN (p).
If hNN (p) ≥ 0, then by (3.3) we have hNi (p) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, · · · , N . In this case, we denote
ĥi(p) = h
N
i (p) for all i = 1, · · · , N . If hNN (p) < 0, then we set ĥN (p) = 0. That is, the N -th seller
does not act at all. We assume that the remaining N − 1 sellers will observe this fact and modify
their strategy as if there are only N − 1 sellers. More precisely, we first choose a choke price p̂N
so that hNN (p1, · · · , pN−1, p̂N ) = 0, and define
hN−1i (p1, p2, · · · , pN−1) := hNi (p1, p2, · · · , pN−1, p̂N ), i = 1, · · · , N − 1,
and continue the game among the N − 1 sellers.
In general, for 1 ≤ n ≤ N −1, assume the (n+1)-th demand functions {hn+1i }n+1i=1 are defined.
If hn+1n+1(p1, · · · , pn+1) < 0, then other n sellers will assume (n + 1)-th seller sets a price at pˆn+1
with zero demand (i.e., hn+1n+1(p1, p2, · · · , pn, pˆn+1) = 0), and modify their demand functions to
hni (p1, p2, · · · , pn) := hn+1i (p1, p2, · · · , pn, pˆn+1), i = 1, · · · , n. (3.5)
We can now define the “actual demand function” {ĥi}Ni=1.
Definition 3.1 (Actual demand function). Assume that {hNi }Ni=1 is a family of demand functions.
The family of “actual demand functions”, denoted by {ĥi}Ni=1, are defined in the following steps:
for a given ordered price vector p,
(i) if hNN (p) ≥ 0, then we set ĥi(p) = hNi (p) for all i = 1, · · · , N ;
(ii) if hNN (p) < 0, then we define recursively for n = N −1, · · · 1 the demand functions {hni }ni=1
as in (3.5). In particular, if there exists an n < N such that hn+1n+1(p1, p2, · · · , pn, pn+1) < 0 and
hnn(p1, p2, · · · , pn) ≥ 0, then we set
ĥi(p) =

h
n
i (p1, p2, · · · , pn) i = 1, · · · , n
0 i = n+ 1, · · · , N ;
(3.6)
(iii) if there is no such n, then ĥi(p) = 0 for all i = 1, · · · , N .
We note that the actual demand function will always be non-negative, but for each price vector
p, the number #{i : ĥi(p) > 0} ≤ N , and could even be zero.
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3.1 The Bertrand game and its Nash equilibrium
Besides the demand function, a key ingredient in the placement decision making process is the
“waiting cost” for the time it takes for the limit order to be executed. We shall assume that each
seller has her own waiting cost function cNi , c
N
i (p1, p2, · · · , pN , Q), where Q is the total number
of shares available in the LOB. Similar to the demand function, we shall assume the following
assumptions for the waiting cost.
Assumption 3.1. For each seller i ∈ {1, · · · , n} with n ∈ [1, N ], each cNi is smooth in all
variables such that
(i) (Monotonicity)
∂cNi
∂pi
> 0, and
∂cNi
∂pj
< 0, for j 6= i;
(ii) (Exchangeability) cNi (p1, · · · , pi, · · · , pj , · · · , pN ) = cNj (p1, · · · , pj , · · · , pi, · · · , pN );
(iii) cNi (p)
∣∣
pi=0
= 0, and
∂cNi
∂pi
∣∣∣
pi=0+
∈ (0, 1);
(iv) limpi→∞
pi
cNi (p)
= 0, i = 1, · · · , N .
Remark 3.2. (i) By exchangeability, in what follows, we shall assume without loss of generality
that all prices are ordered.
(ii) Assumption 3.1-(i), (ii) ensure that the price ordering leads to the same ordering for
waiting cost functions, similar to what we argued before for demand functions.
(iii) Consider the function Ji(p,Q) = pi − cNi (p,Q). Assumption 3.1 amounts to saying
that Ji(p,Q)
∣∣
pi=0
= 0, ∂Ji(p,Q)∂pi
∣∣∣
pi=0+
> 0, and limpi→∞ Ji(p,Q) < 0. Thus, there exists p
0
i =
p0i (p−i, Q) > 0 such that
∂Ji(p,Q)
∂pi
∣∣∣
pi=p0i
= 0, and ∂Ji(p,Q)∂pi
∣∣∣
pi>p0i
< 0.
(iv) Since Ji(0, Q) = 0, and
∂Ji(p,Q)
∂pi
∣∣∣
pi=0+
> 0, one can easily check that Ji(p
0
i , Q) > 0.
This, together with Assumption 3.1-(iv), shows that there exists p˜i = p˜i(p−i, Q) > p
0
i , such that
Ji(pi, Q)
∣∣
pi=p˜i
= 0 (or, equivalently cNi (p1, · · · , pi−1, p˜i, pi+1, · · · , pN , Q) = p˜i). Furthermore, the
Remark (iii) implies that Ji(pi, Q) < 0 for all pi > p˜i(p−i, Q). In other words, any selling price
higher than p˜i(p−i, Q) would yield a negative profit, and therefore should be prevented.
The Bertrand game among sellers can now be formally introduced: each seller chooses its price
to maximize profit in a non-cooperative manner, and their decision will be based not only on her
own price, but also on the actions of all other sellers. We denote the profit of each seller by
Πi(p1, p2, · · · , pN , Q) := ĥi(p1, p2, · · · , pN )[pi − cNi (p1, p2, · · · , pN , Q)], (3.7)
and each seller tries to maximize her profit Π. For each fixed Q, we are looking for a Nash equilib-
rium price vector p∗,N (Q) = (p∗,N1 (Q), · · · , p∗,NN (Q)). We note that in the case when ĥi(p∗,N ) = 0
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for some i, the i-th seller will not participate in the game (with zero profit), so we shall modify
the price
p∗,Ni (Q) , c
N
i (p
∗,N
1 , · · · , p∗,NN , Q) = cNi (p∗,N , Q), (3.8)
and consider a subgame involving the N − 1 sellers, and so on. That is, for a subgame with n
sellers, they solve
p∗,ni = argmaxp≥0
Πni (p
∗,n
1 , p
∗,n
2 , · · · , p∗,ni−1, p, p∗,ni+1, · · · , p∗,nn , Q), i = 1, · · · , n (3.9)
to get p∗,n = (p∗,n1 , · · · , p∗,nn , c∗,n+1n+1 , · · · , c∗,NN ). More precisely, we define a Nash Equilibrium as
follows.
Definition 3.2. A vector of prices p∗ = p∗(Q) = (p∗1, p
∗
2, · · · , p∗N ) is called a Nash equilibrium if
p∗i = argmax
p≥ci
Πi(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, · · · , p∗i−1, p, p∗i+1, · · · , p∗N , Q), (3.10)
and p∗i = c
∗,i
i (p
∗, Q) whenever ĥi(p
∗) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
We assume the following on a subgame for our discussion.
Assumption 3.3. For n = 1, · · · , N , we assume that there exists a unique solution to the system
of maximization problems in equation (3.9).
Remark 3.4. We observe from Definition of the Nash Equilibrium that, in equilibrium, a seller is
actually participating in the Bertrand game only when her actual demand function is positive, and
those with zero actual demand function will be ignored in the subsequent subgames. However,
a participating seller does not necessarily have positive profit unless she sets the price higher
than the waiting cost. In other words, it is possible that ĥi(p
∗) > 0, but p∗i = ci(p
∗, Q), so that
Πi(p
∗, Q) = 0. We refer to such a case the boundary case, and denote the price to be c∗,bi .
The following result details the procedure of finding the Nash equilibrium for the Bertrand
competition. The idea is quite similar to that in [14], except for the general form of the waiting
cost. We sketch the proof for completeness.
Proposition 3.5. Assume that Assumption 3.1 is in force. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium
to the Bertrand game (3.7) and (3.10).
Moreover, the equilibrium point p∗, after the modifications, should take the following form:
p∗ = (p∗1, · · · , p∗k, c∗,bk+1, · · · , c∗,bn , c∗n+1, · · · , c∗N ), (3.11)
from which we can immediately read: ĥi(p
∗) > 0 and p∗i > c
∗
i , i = 1, · · · , k; ĥi(p∗) > 0 but p∗i ≤ c∗i ,
i = k + 1, · · · , n; and ĥi(p∗) ≤ 0, i = n+ 1, · · · , N .
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Proof. We start with N sellers, and we shall drop the superscript N from all the notations,
for simplicity. Let p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, · · · , p∗N ) be the candidate equilibrium prices (obtained by, for
example, the first-order condition). By exchangeability, we can assume without loss of generality
that the prices are ordered: p∗1 ≤ p∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ p∗N , and so are the corresponding cost functions
c∗1 ≤ c∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ c∗N , where c∗i = ci(p∗, Q) for i = 1, · · · , N .
We first compare p∗,NN and c
∗,N
N .
Case 1. p∗N > c
∗
N . We consider the following cases:
(a) If hNN (p
∗) > 0, then by Definition 3.1 we have ĥi(p
∗) = hNi (p
∗) > 0, for all i, and p∗ =
(p∗1, p
∗
2, · · · , p∗N ) is an equilibrium point.
(b) If hNN (p
∗) ≤ 0, then in light of the definition of actual demand function (Definition 3.1), we
have ĥN (p
∗) = 0. Thus, the N -th seller will have zero profit regardless where she sets the price.
We shall require in this case that the N -th seller reduces her price to c∗N , and we shall consider
remaining (N − 1)-sellers’ candidate equilibrium prices p∗,N−1 = (p∗,N−11 , · · · , p∗,N−1N−1 ).
Case 2. p∗N ≤ c∗N . In this case the N -th seller would have a non-positive profit at the best.
Thus, she sets p∗N = c
∗
N , and quits the game, and again the problem is reduced to a subgame with
(N − 1) sellers, and in Case 1-(b).
We should note that it is possible that hNN (p
∗) > 0 but p∗N ≤ c∗N . In this case, the profit would
be non-positive, and the best option for the N -th seller is still to set p∗N = c
∗
N and quit. Such a
case is known as the “boundary case”, and we use the notation p∗N = c
∗,b
N to indicate this case.
Repeating the same procedure for the subgames (for n = N−1, · · · , 2), we see that eventually
we will get a modified equilibrium point p∗ of the form (3.11), proving the proposition.
3.2 A linear mean-field case
In this subsection, we consider a special case, studied in [28], but with the modified waiting cost
functions. More precisely, we assume that there are N sellers, each with demand function
hNi (p1, · · · , pN ) , A−Bpi +Cp¯Ni , (3.12)
where A,B,C > 0, and B > C, and p¯Ni =
1
N−1
N∑
j 6=i
pj. We note that the structure of the demand
function (3.12) obviously reflects a mean-field nature, and one can easily check that it satisfies all
the assumptions mentioned in the previous section. Furthermore, as was shown in [28, Proposition
2.4], the actual demand function takes the form: for each n ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1},
hni (p1, · · · , pn) = an − bnpi + cnp¯ni , for i = 1, · · · , n,
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where p¯ni =
1
n−1
n∑
j 6=i
pj, and the parameters (an, bn, cn) can be calculated recursively for n =
N, · · · , 1, with aN = A, bN = B and cN = C. We note that in these works the (waiting) costs
are assumed to be constant.
Let us now assume further that the waiting cost is also linear. For example, for n = 1, · · · , N ,
cni = c
n
i (pi, p¯
n
i , Q) , xn(Q)pi − yn(Q)p¯ni , xn(Q), yn(Q) > 0.
Note that the profit function for seller i is
Πi(p1, · · · , pn, Q) = (an − bnpi + cnp¯ni ) · (pi − (xnpi − ynp¯ni )) . (3.13)
An easy calculation shows that the critical point for the maximizer is
p∗,ni =
an
2bn
+
(
cn
2bn
− yn
2(1 − xn)
)
p¯ni , (3.14)
which is the optimal choice of seller i if the other sellers set prices with average p¯ni =
1
n−1
∑n
j 6=i p
∗
j .
Now, let us define
p¯n :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
p∗i =
an(1− xn)
2bn(1− xn)− cn(1− xn) + bnyn . (3.15)
Then, it is readily seen that p¯ni =
n
n−1 p¯
n − 1n−1p∗i , which means (plugging back into (3.14))
p∗,ni =
an
2bn +
cn
n−1 − 1n−1 bnyn1−xn
+
1
n−1
n
2bn(1−xn)
cn(1−xn)−bnyn
+ 1n
p¯n. (3.16)
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the coefficients (an, bn, cn, xn(Q), yn(Q)) converge
to (a, b, c, x(Q), y(Q)) as n→∞. Then, we see from (3.15) and (3.16) that

lim
n→∞
p¯n =
a(1− x)
2b(1− x)− c(1 − x) + by =: p¯;
lim
n→∞
p∗,ni =
a
2b
+
c(1− x)− by
2b(1 − x) limn→∞ p¯
n =
a(1− x)
(2b− c)(1− x) + by =: p
∗.
(3.17)
It is worth noting that if we assume that there is a “representing seller” who randomly sets
prices p = pi with equal probability
1
n , then we can randomize the profit function (3.13):
Πn(p, p¯) = (an − bnp+ cn · p¯){p− (xnp− yn · p¯)}, (3.18)
where p is a random variable taking values {pi} with equal probability, and p¯ ∼ E[p], thanks to
the Law of Large Numbers, when n is large enough. In particular, in the limiting case as n→∞,
we can replace the randomized profit function Πn in (3.18) by:
Π∞ = Π(p,E[p]) := (a− bp+ cE[p]){p − (xp− yE[p])}. (3.19)
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A similar calculation as (3.14) shows that (p∗,E[p∗]) ∈ argmaxΠ(p,E[p]) will take the form
p∗ =
c(1 − x)− by
2b(1− x) E[p
∗] +
a
2b
and E[p∗] =
a(1 − x)
2b(1 − x)− c(1 − x) + by .
Consequently, we see that p∗ = a(1−x)(2b−c)(1−x)+by , as we see in (3.17).
Remark 3.6. The analysis above indicates the following facts: (i) If we consider the sellers in a
“homogeneous” way, and as the number of sellers becomes large enough, all of them will actually
choose the same strategy, as if there is a “representing seller” that places the prices uniformly; (ii)
The limit of equilibrium prices actually coincides with the optimal strategy of the representing
seller under a limiting profit function. These facts are quite standard in mean-field theory, and
will be used as the basis for our dynamic model for the (sell) LOB in the next section.
4 Mean-field type liquidity dynamics in continuous time
In this section we extend the idea of Bertrand game to the continuous time setting. To begin
with, we assume that the contribution of each individual seller to the LOB is measured by the
“liquidity” (i.e., the number of shares of the given asset) she provides, which is the function of
the selling price she chooses, hence under the “Bertrand game” framework.
4.1 A general description
We begin by assuming that there are N sellers, and denote the liquidity that the i-th seller “adds”
to the LOB at time t by Qit. We shall assume that it is a pure jump Markov process, with the
following generator: for any f ∈ C([0, T ]× RN ), and (t, q) ∈ [0, T ]× RN ,
A i,N [f ](t, q) :=
∫
R
λi(t, q, θ)[f(t, q−i(qi + h
i(t, θ, z)) − f(t, q)− 〈 ∂xif, hi(t, θ, z) 〉]νi(dz), (4.1)
where q ∈ RN , and q−i(y) = (q1, · · · , qi−1, y, qi+1, · · · , qN ). Furthermore, hi denotes the “demand
function” for the i-th seller, and θ ∈ Rk is a certain market parameter which will be specified
later. Roughly speaking, (4.1) indicates that the i-th seller would act (or “jump”) at stopping
times {τ ij}∞j=1 with the waiting times τ ij+1−τ ij having exponential distribution with intensity λi(·),
and jump size being determined by the demand function hi(· · · ). The total liquidity provided by
all the sellers is then a pure jump process with the generator
A N [f ](t, q, θ) =
N∑
i=1
A i,N [f ](t, q), q ∈ RN , N ∈ N, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.2)
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We now specify the functions λi and hi further. Recalling the demand function introduced in
the previous section, we assume that there are two functions λ and h, such that for each i,
λi(t, q, θ) = λ(t, pi, qi, µN ), hi(t, θ, z) = h(t, x, pi, qi, z), (t, x, p, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R2N , (4.3)
where µN := 1N
∑N
i=1 δpi , x denotes the fundamental price at time t, and p
i is the sell price. We
shall consider p = (p1, · · · , pN ) as the control variable, as the Bertrand game suggests. Now, if
we assume νi = ν for all i, then we have a pure jump Markov game of mean-field-type, similar
to the one considered in [6], in which each seller adds liquidity (in terms of number of shares)
dynamically as a pure jump Markov process, denoted by Qit, t ≥ 0, with the kernel
ν(t, qi, µN , pi, dz) = λ(t, pi, qi, µN )[ν ◦ h−1(t, x, pi, qi, ·)](dz). (4.4)
Furthermore, in light of the static case studied in the previous section, we shall assume that the
seller’s instantaneous profit at time t > 0 takes the form (pit − cit)∆Qit, where cit is the “waiting
cost” for i-th seller at time t. We observe that the actual submitted sell price pi can be written
as pi = x + li, where x is the “mid price” and li is the distance from the mid price that the
i-th seller chooses to set. Now let us assume that there is an invertible relationship between the
selling prices p and the corresponding number of shares q, e.g., p = ϕ(q) (such a relation is often
used to convert the Bertrand game to Cournot game, see, e.g., [28]), and consider l as the control
variable. We can then rewrite the functions λ and h of (4.3) in the following form:
λ(t, pi, qi, µN ) = λ(t, qi, li, µ˜N (ϕ(q))), h(t, x, pi, qi, z) = h(t, x, qi, li, z). (4.5)
To simplify the presentation, in what follows, we shall assume that λ does not depend on the
control variable li, and that all coefficients λ and h are time-homogeneous. In other words, we
assume that each Qi follows a pure jump SDE studied in §2:
Qit = q
i +
∫ t
0
∫
A×R+
h(Xr, Q
i
r−, l
i
r, z)1[0,λ(Qir−,µNϕ(Qr))]
(y)N s(drdzdy), (4.6)
where Qt = (Q
1
t , · · · , QNt ), N s is a Poission random measure on R+ × R × R+, and {Xt}t≥0 is
the mid-price process of the underlying asset which we assume to satisfy the SDE (cf. [33]):
Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
b(Xt,xr )dr +
∫ s
t
σ(Xt,xr )dWr, (4.7)
where b and σ are deterministic functions satisfying some standard conditions. We shall assume
that the i-th seller is aiming at maximizing the expected total accumulated profit:
E
{∑
t≥0
(pit − cit)∆Qit
}
= E
{∫ ∞
0
∫
A
h(Xt, Q
i
t, l
i
t, z)(Xt + l
i
t − cit)λ(Qit, µNϕ(Qt))νs(dz)dt
}
. (4.8)
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We remark that in (4.8) the time horizon is allowed to be infinity, which can be easily converted
to finite horizon by setting h(Xt, · · · ) = 0 for t ≥ T , for a given time horizon T > 0, which we
do not want to specify at this point. Instead, our focus will be mainly on the limiting behavior
of the equilibrium when N → ∞. In fact, given the “symmetric” nature of the problem (i.e.,
all seller’s having the same λ and h), as well as the results in the previous section, we envision
a “representing seller” in a limiting mean-field type control problem whose optimal strategy
coincides with the limit of N -seller Nash equilibrium as N →∞, just as the well-known continuous
diffusion cases (see, e.g., [30] and [10, 13]). We should note such a result for pure jump cases has
been substantiated in a recent work [6], in which it was shown that, under reasonable conditions,
in the limit the total liquidity Qt =
∑N
i=1Q
i
t will converge to a pure jump Markovian process with
a mean-field type generator. Based on this result, as well as the individual optimization problem
(4.6) and (4.8), it is reasonable to consider the following (limiting) mean-filed-type pure-jump
stochastic control problem for a representing seller, whose total liquidity has a dynamics that can
be characterized by the following mean-field type pure-jump SDE:
Qt = q +
∫ t
0
∫
A×R+
h(Xr, Qr−, lr, z)1[0,λ(Qr−,PQr )](y)N s(drdzdy), (4.9)
where λ(Q,PQ) := λ(Q,E[ϕ(Q)]) by a slight abuse of notation, and with the cost functional:
Π(q, l) = E
{∫ ∞
0
∫
A
h(Xt, Qt, lt, z)(Xt + lt − ct)λ(Qt,PQt)νs(dz)dt
}
. (4.10)
4.2 Problem formulation
With the general description in mind, we now give the formulation of our problem. First, we
note that the liquidity of the limit order book will not only be affected by the liquidity providers
(i.e., the sellers), but also by liquidity “consumer”, that is, the market buy orders as well as the
cancellations of sell orders (which we assume is free of charge). We shall describe its collective
movement (in terms of number of shares) of all such “consumptional” orders as a compound
Poisson process, denoted by βt =
∑Nt
i=1Λt, t ≥ 0, where {Nt} is a standard Poisson process with
parameter λ, and {Λi} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking values in a set B ⊆ R, with
distribution ν. Without loss of generality, we assume that counting measure of β coincides with
the canonical Poisson random measure N b, so that the Le´vy measure is νb = λν. In other words,
βt :=
∫ t
0
∫
B z N˜ b(drdz), and the total liquidity satisfies the SDE:
Q0t = q +
∫ t
0
∫
A×R+
h(Xr, Q
0
r−, lr, z)1[0,λ(Q0r−,PQ0r )]
(y)N s(drdzdy) − βt. (4.11)
We remark that there are two technical issues for the dynamics (4.11). First, the presence
of the buy order process β brings in the possibility that Q0t < 0, which should never happen
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in reality. We shall therefore assume that the buy order has a natural upper limit: the total
available liquidity Q0t , that is, if we denote Sβ = {t : ∆βt 6= 0}, then for all t ∈ Sβ, we have
Q0t = (Q
0
t− −∆βt)+. Consequently, we can assume that there exists a process K = {Kt}, where
K is a non-decreasing, pure jump process such that (i) SK = Sβ; (ii) ∆Kt := (Qt− − ∆βt)−,
t ∈ SK ; and (iii) the Q0-dynamics (4.11) can be written as
Qt = q +
∫ t
0
∫
A×R+
h(Xr, Qr−, lr, z)1[0,λ(Qr−,PQr )](y)N s(drdzdy) − βt +Kt
= q +
∫ t
0
∫
A×R+
h(Xr, Qr−, lr, z)1[0,λ(Qr−,PQr )](y)N˜ s(drdzdy) (4.12)
−
∫ t
0
∫
B
z N˜ b(drdz) +
∫ t
0
∫
A
h(Xr, Qr, lr, z)λ(Qr,PQr)ν
s(dz)dr +Kt, t ≥ 0.
whereK is a “reflecting process”, and N˜ s(drdzdy) is the compensated Poisson martingale measure
of N s. That is, (4.12) is a (pure-jump) mean-field SDE with reflection as was studied in §2.
Now, in light of the discussion of MFSDER in §2, we shall consider the following two MFSDERs
that are slightly more general than (4.12): for ξ ∈ L2(Ft;R), q ∈ R, and 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
Qt,ξs = ξ +
∫ s
t
∫
A×R+
h(Xt,xr , Q
t,ξ
r−, lr, z) 1[0,λ(Qt,ξr−,PQt,ξr
)]
(y)N˜ s(drdzdy)
−
∫ s
t
∫
B
z N˜ b(drdz) +
∫ s
t
a(Xt,xr , Q
t,ξ
r ,PQt,ξr
, lr)dr +K
t,ξ
s , (4.13)
Qt,q,ξs = q +
∫ s
t
∫
A×R+
h(Xt,xr , Q
t,q,ξ
r− , lr, z) 1[0,λ(Qt,q,ξr− ,PQt,ξr
)]
(y)N˜ s(drdzdy)
−
∫ s
t
∫
B
z N˜ b(drdz) +
∫ s
t
a(Xt,xr , Q
t,q,ξ
r ,PQt,ξr
, lr)dr +K
t,q,ξ
s , (4.14)
where l = {ls} is the control process for seller, and Qs = Qt,q,ξs , s ≥ t, is the total liquidity of the
sell-side LOB. We shall consider the following set of admissible strategies:
Uad := {l ∈ L1F([0,∞);R+) : l is F-predictable}. (4.15)
The objective of the seller is to solve the following mean-field stochastic control problem:
v(x, q,Pξ) = sup
l∈Uad
Π(x, q,Pξ, l) = sup
l∈Uad
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−ρrL(Xxr , Q
q,ξ
r ,PQξr
, lr)dr
}
(4.16)
where L(x, q, µ, l) :=
∫
A h(x, q, l, z)c(x, q, l)λ(q, µ)ν
s(dz), and Uad is defined in (4.15). Here we
denote Xx := X0,x, Qq,ξ := Q0,q,ξ.
Remark 4.1. (i) In (4.13) and (4.14), we allow a slightly more general drift function a, which in
particular could be a(x, q, µ, l) = λ(q, µ)
∫
A h(x, q, l, z)ν
s(dz), as is in (4.12).
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(ii) In (4.16), the pricing function c(x, q, l) is a more general expression of the original form
x+ l − c in (4.10), taking into account the possible dependence of the waiting cost ct on the sell
position l and the total liquidity q at time t.
(iii) Compared to (4.10), we see that a discounting factor e−ρt is added to the cost functional
Π(· · · ) in (4.16), reflecting its nature as the “present value”.
In the rest of the paper we shall assume that the market parameters b, σ, λ, h, the pricing
function c in (4.13) – (4.16), and the discounting factor ρ satisfy the following assumptions.
Assumption 4.2. All functions b, σ ∈ C0(R), λ ∈ L0(R ×P2(R);R+), h ∈ L0(R2 × R+ × A),
and c ∈ L0(R ×R+ × R+) are bounded, and satisfy the following conditions, respectively:
(i) b and σ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x with Lipschitz constant L > 0;
(ii) σ(0) = 0 and b(0) ≥ 0;
(iii) λ and h satisfy Assumption 2.1;
(iv) For l ∈ R+, c(x, q, l) is Lipschitz continuous in (x, q), with Lipschitz constant L > 0;
(v) h is non-increasing, and c is non-decreasing in the variable l;
(vi) ρ > L+ 12L
2, where L > 0 is the Lipschitz constant in Assumption 2.1;
(vii) For (x, µ, l) ∈ R+ ×P2(R)× R+, Π(x, q, µ, l) is convex in q.
Remark 4.3. (i) The monotonicity assumptions in Assumption 4.2-(v) are inherited from §3.
Specifically, they are the assumption (3.1) for h, and Assumption 3.1-(i) for c, respectively.
(ii) Under Assumption 4.2, one can easily check that the SDEs (4.7) as well as (4.13) and
(4.14) all have pathwisely unique strong solutions in L2
F
(D([0, T ])), thanks to Theorem 2.3; and
Assumption 4.2-(ii) implies that Xt,xs ≥ 0, s ∈ [t,∞), P-a.s., whenever x ≥ 0.
5 Dynamic programming principle and HJB equation
In this section we substantiate the dynamic programming principle (DPP) for the stochastic
control problem (4.13)–(4.16). We begin by examining some basic properties of the value function.
Proposition 5.1. Under the Assumptions 2.1 and 4.2, the value function v(x, q,Pξ) is Lipschitz
continuous in (x, q,Pξ), non-decreasing in x, and decreasing in q.
Proof. We first check the Lipschitz property in x. For x, x′ ∈ R, denote Xx = X0,x and
Xx
′
= X0,x
′
as the corresponding solutions to (4.7), respectively. Denote ∆Xt = X
x
t −Xx
′
t , and
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∆x = x− x′. Then, applying Itoˆ’s formula to |∆Xt|2 and by some standard arguments, one has
|∆Xt|2 = |∆x|2 +
∫ t
0
(2αs + β
2
s )|∆Xs|2ds+
∫ t
0
2βs|∆Xs|2dWs,
where α, β are two processes bounded by the Lipschitz constants L in Assumption 2.1, thanks
to Assumption 4.2. Thus, one can easily check, by taking expectation and applying Burkholder-
Davis-Gundy and Gronwall inequalities, that
E[|∆X|∗,2t ] ≤ |∆x|2e(2L+L
2)t, t ≥ 0. (5.1)
Furthermore, it is clear that, under Assumption 4.2, the function L(x, q, µ, l) is uniformly
Lipschitz in x, uniformly in (q, µ, l). That is, for some generic constant C > 0 which is allowed to
vary from line to line, we have
|Π(x, q,Pξ, l)−Π(x′, q,Pξ, l)| ≤ CE
[ ∫ ∞
0
∫
A
e−ρt|∆Xt|νs(dz)dt
]
≤ CE
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
√
E[|∆X|∗,2t ]dt
]
≤ C|∆x|
∫ ∞
0
e−ρte(L+
1
2
L2)tdt ≤ C|x− x′|.
Here the last inequality is due to Assumption 4.2-(vi). Consequently, we obtain
|v(x, q,Pξ)− v(x′, q,Pξ)| ≤ C|x− x′|, ∀x, x′ ∈ R. (5.2)
To check the Lipschitz properties for q and Pξ, we denote, for (q,Pξ) ∈ R+ ×P2(R), hq,ξs ≡
h(Xs, Q
t,q,ξ
s , ls, z), λ
q,ξ
s ≡ λ(Qt,q,ξs ,PQt,ξs ), and c
q,ξ
s ≡ c(Xs, Qt,q,ξs , ls), s ≥ t. Furthermore, for q, q′ ∈
R+ and Pξ,Pξ′ ∈ P2(R), we deonte ∆ψr ≡ ψq,ξr − ψq
′,ξ′
r for ψ = h, λ, c. Now, by Assumptions 2.1
and 4.2, and following a similar argument of Theorem 2.3, one shows that
|Π(x, q,Pξ, l)−Π(x, q′,Pξ′ , l)|
≤ E
{∫ ∞
0
∫
A
e−ρr
(
hq,ξr c
q,ξ
r |∆λr|+ cq,ξr λq
′,ξ′
r |∆hr|+ hq
′,ξ′
r λ
q′,ξ′
r |∆cr|
)
νs(dz)dr
}
≤ E
{∫ ∞
0
∫
A
e−ρr|Qt,q,ξr −Qt,q
′,ξ′
r |νs(dz)dr
}
≤ C (|q − q′|+W1(Pξ,Pξ′)) ,
which implies that
|v(x, q,Pξ)− v(x, q′,P′ξ)| ≤ C
(|q − q′|+W1(Pξ,Pξ′)) . (5.3)
Finally, the respective monotonicity of the value function on x and q follows from the com-
parison theorem of the corresponding SDEs and Assumption 4.2. This completes the proof.
We now turn our attention to the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP). The argument will
be very similar to that of [33], except for some adjustments to deal with the mean-field terms.
But, by using the flow-property (2.9) we can carry out the argument without substantial difficulty.
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Theorem 5.1. Assume that Assumptions 2.1 and 4.2 are in force. Then, for any (x, q,Pξ) ∈
R
2 ×P2(R) and for any t ∈ (0,∞),
v(x, q,Pξ) = sup
l∈Uad
E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsL(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds + e
−ρtv(Xxt , Q
q,ξ;l
t ,PQξ;lt
)
]
. (5.4)
Proof. Let us denote the right side of (5.4) by v˜(x, q,Pξ) = supl Π˜(x, q,Pξ ; l). We first note
that Xr and (Q
t,ξ
r , Q
t,q,ξ
r ) have the flow property. So, for any l ∈ Uad,
Π(x, q,Pξ ; l) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρsL(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds
]
(5.5)
= E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsL(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds + e
−ρt
E
{∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)L(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds
∣∣∣Ft}]
= E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsL(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds + e
−ρtΠ(Xxt , Q
q,ξ;l
t ,PQξ;lt
; l)
]
≤ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsL(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds + e
−ρtv(Xxt , Q
q,ξ;l
t ,PQξ;lt
)
]
= Π˜(x, q,Pξ; l).
This implies that v(x, q,Pξ) ≤ v˜(x, q,Pξ).
To prove the other direction, let us denote Γ = R+ × R×P2(R), and consider, at each time
t ∈ (0,∞), a countable partition {Γi}∞i=1 of Γ and (xi, qi,Pξi) ∈ Γi, ξi ∈ L2(Ft), i = 1, 2, · · · ,
such that for any (x, q, µ) ∈ Γi and for fixed ε > 0, it holds |x − xi| ≤ ε, qi − ε ≤ q ≤ qi, and
W2(µ,Pξi) ≤ ε. Now, for each i, choose an ε-optimal strategy li ∈ Uad, such that v(t, xi, qi,Pξi) ≤
Π(t, xi, qi,Pξi ; l
i) + ε, where Π(t, xi, qi,Pξi ; l
i) := E[
∫∞
t e
−ρ(s−t)L(Xt,xis , Q
t,qi,ξi
s ,PQt,ξis
, lis)ds] and
v(t, xi, qi,Pξi) = supli∈Uad Π(t, xi, qi,Pξi ; l
i).
Then, by definition of the value function and the Lipschitz properties (Proposition 5.1) with
some constant C > 0, for any (x, q, µ) ∈ Γi, it holds that
Π(t, x, q, µ; li) ≥ Π(t, xi, qi,Pξi ; li)− Cε ≥ v(t, xi, qi,Pξi)− (C + 1)ε
≥ v(t, x, q, µ) − (2C + 1)ε. (5.6)
Now, for any l ∈ Uad, we define a new strategy l˜ as follows:
l˜s := ls1[0,t](s) +
[∑
i
lis1Γi(X
x
t , Q
q,ξ;l
t ,PQξ;lt
)
]
1(t,∞)(s). (5.7)
Then, clearly l˜ ∈ Uad. To simplify notation, let us denote
I1 =
∫ t
0
e−ρsL(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds. (5.8)
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By applying (5.6) and flow property, we have
v(x, q, µ) ≥ Π(x, q, µ; l˜)
= E
[
I1 + e
−ρt
E
{∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)L(Xxs , Q
q,ξ;l
s ,PQξ;ls
, ls)ds
∣∣∣Ft}]
= E
[
I1 + e
−ρtΠ(t,Xxt , Q
q,ξ
t ,PQξt
; l˜)
]
= E
[
I1 + e
−ρt
∑
i
Π(t,Xxt , Q
q,ξ
t ,PQξt
; li)1Γi(X
x
t , Q
q,ξ
t ,PQξt
)
]
≥ E
[
I1 + e
−ρtv(Xxt , Q
q,ξ
t ,PQξt
)
]
− (2C + 1)ε = Π˜(x, q,Pξ; l)− (2C + 1)ε.
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we get v(x, q,Pξ) ≥ v˜(x, q,Pξ), proving (5.4).
Remark 5.2. We should note that while it is difficult to specify all the boundary conditions for
the value function, the case when q = 0 is relatively clear. Note that q = 0 means there is zero
liquidity for the asset, then by definition of the liquidity dynamics (4.12) we see that Qt will stay
at zero until the first positive jump happens. During that period of time there would be no trade,
thus by DPP (5.4) we should have
v(x, 0, µ) ≡ 0. (5.9)
Furthermore, since the value function v is non-increasing in q, thanks to Proposition 5.1, and is
always non-negative, we can easily see that the following boundary condition is also natural.
∂qv(x, 0, µ) ≡ 0. (5.10)
We shall use (5.9) and (5.10) frequently in our future discussion.
6 HJB equation and its viscosity solutions
In this section, we shall formally derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated
to the stochastic control problem studied in the previous section, and show that the value function
of the control problem is indeed a viscosity solution of the HJB equation.
To begin with, we first note that, given the DPP (5.4), as well as the boundary conditions
(5.9) and (5.10), if the value function v is smooth, then by standard arguments with the help of
the Itoˆ’s formula (2.18) and the fact that
∂qv(Xt−, Qt−,PXt−)1{Qt−=0}dKt = ∂qv(Xt−, 0,PXt−)1{Qt−=0}dKt ≡ 0,
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it is not difficult to show that the value function should satisfy the following HJB equation:

ρv(x, q, µ) = sup
l∈R+
[J lv(x, q, µ) + L(x, q, µ, l)],
v(x, 0, µ) = 0, ∂qv(x, 0, µ) = 0,
(x, q, µ) ∈ R× R+ ×P2(R), (6.1)
where J l is an integro-differential operator defined by, for any φ ∈ C2,(2,1)b (R× R+ ×P2(R)),
J lφ(x, q, µ)
△
= b(x)∂xφ(x, q, µ) + σ
2(x)
1
2
∂2xxφ(x, q, µ) + a(x, q, µ, l)∂qφ(x, q, µ)
+
∫
A
(
φ(x, q + h(x, q, l, z), µ) − φ(x, q, µ) − ∂qφ(x, q, µ)h(x, q, l, z)
)
λ(q, µ)νs(dz)
−
∫
B
(
φ(x, q − z, µ)− φ(x, q, µ)− ∂qφ(x, q, µ)z
)
νb(dz) + E˜
[
∂µφ(x, q, µ, ξ˜)a(x, ξ˜, µ, l)
]
+E˜
[ ∫ 1
0
∫
A
(
∂µφ(x, q, µ, ξ˜ + γh(x, ξ˜, l, z)) − ∂µφ(x, q, µ, ξ˜)
)
h(x, ξ˜, l, z)λ(ξ˜, µ)νs(dz)dγ
]
−E˜
[ ∫ 1
0
∫
B
(
∂µφ(x, q, µ, ξ˜ − γz)− ∂µφ(x, q, µ, ξ˜)
)
× zνb(dz)dγ
]
. (6.2)
We note that in general, whether there exists smooth solutions to the HJB equation (6.1) is by
no means clear. We therefore introduce the notion of viscosity solution for (6.1). To this end,
write D := R× R+ ×P2(R), and for (x, q, µ) ∈ D , we denote
U (x, q, µ) :=
{
ϕ ∈ C2,(2,1)b (D) : v(x, q, µ) = ϕ(x, q, µ)
}
;
U (x, q, µ) :=
{
ϕ ∈ U (x, q, µ) : v − ϕ has a strict maximum at (x, q, µ)
}
;
U (x, q, µ) :=
{
ϕ ∈ U (x, q, µ) : v − ϕ has a strict minimum at (x, q, µ)
}
.
Definition 6.1. We say a continuous function v : D 7→ R+ is a viscosity subsolution (supersolu-
tion, resp.) of (6.1) in D if
ρϕ(x, q, µ) − sup
l∈R+
[J lϕ(x, q, µ) + L(x, q, µ, l)] ≤ 0, (resp. ≥ 0) (6.3)
for every ϕ ∈ U (x, q, µ) (resp. ϕ ∈ U (x, q, µ)).
A function v : D 7→ R+ is called a viscosity solution of (6.1) on D if it is both a viscosity
subsolution and a viscosity supersolution of (6.1) on D .
Our main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Assume that the Assumptions 2.1 and 4.2 are in force. Then, the value function
v, defined by (4.16), is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation (6.1).
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Proof. For a fixed ¯x := (x¯, q¯, µ¯) ∈ D with µ¯ = Pξ¯ and ξ¯ ∈ L2(F ;R), and any η > 0, define
D¯x,η := {x = (x, q, µ) ∈ D : ‖x− ¯x‖ < η}. (6.4)
where ‖x− ¯x‖ :=
(
|x− x¯|2 + |q − q¯|2 +W2(µ, µ¯)
)1/2
, and µ = Pξ with ξ ∈ L2(F ;R).
We first prove that the value function v is a subsolution to the HJB equation (6.1). We proceed
by contradiction. Suppose not. Then there exist some ϕ ∈ U (x) and ε0 > 0 such that
ρϕ(¯x)− sup
l∈R+
[J l[ϕ](¯x) + L(¯x, l)] =: 2ε0 > 0. (6.5)
Since Al(x) := J lϕ(x) +L(x, l) is uniformly continuous in x, uniformly in l, thanks to Assump-
tion 4.2, one shows that there exists η > 0 such that for any x ∈ D¯x,η, it holds that
ρϕ(x) − sup
l∈R+
[J l[ϕ](x) + L(x, l)] ≥ ε0. (6.6)
Furthermore, since ϕ ∈ U (x), we assume without loss of generality that 0 = v(¯x) − ϕ(¯x) is the
strict maximum. Thus for the given η > 0, there exists δ > 0, such that
max {v(x) − ϕ(x) : x /∈ D¯x,η} = −δ < 0, (6.7)
On the other hand, for a fixed ε ∈ (0,min(ε0, δρ)), by the continuity of v we can assume,
modifying η > 0 if necessary, that
|v(x) − v(¯x)| = |v(x) − ϕ(¯x)| < ε, x ∈ D¯x,η. (6.8)
Next, for any T > 0 and any l ∈ Uad we set τT := inf{t ≥ 0 : Θ¯t /∈ D¯x,η} ∧ T , where
Θ¯t := (X
x¯
t , Q
q¯,ξ¯,l
t ,PQq¯,ξ¯t
). Applying Itoˆ’s formula (2.18) to e−ρtϕ(Θ¯t) from 0 to τ
T and noting that
v(¯x) = ϕ(¯x) we have
E
[ ∫ τT
0
e−ρtL(Θ¯t, lt)dt+ e
−ρτT v(Θ¯τT )
]
= E
[ ∫ τT
0
e−ρtL(Θ¯t, lt)dt+ e
−ρτTϕ(Θ¯τT ) + e
−ρτT [v − ϕ](Θ¯τT )
]
= E
[ ∫ τT
0
e−ρt
(
L(Θ¯t, lt) +J
l[ϕ](Θ¯t)− ρϕ(Θ¯t)
)
dt+ e−ρτ
T
[v − ϕ](Θ¯τT )
]
+ v(¯x) (6.9)
≤ E
[
− ε
ρ
(1− e−ρτT ) + e−ρτT [v − ϕ](Θ¯τT )
]
+ v(¯x)
= E
[
e−ρτ
T
(ε
ρ
+ [v − ϕ](Θ¯τT )
)
: τT < T
]
+ E
[
e−ρτ
T
(ε
ρ
+ [v − ϕ](Θ¯τT )
)
: τT = T
]
+v(¯x)− ε
ρ
.
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Now note that on the set {τT < T} we must have Θ¯τT /∈ D¯x,η, thus [v−ϕ](Θ¯τT ) ≤ −δ, thanks to
(6.7). On the other hand, on the set {τT = T} we have Θ¯τT = Θ¯T ∈ D¯x,η, and then (6.8) implies
that [v − ϕ](Θ¯T ) ≤ v(¯x)− ϕ(Θ¯T ) + ε. Plugging these facts in (6.9), we can easily obtain that
E
[ ∫ τT
0
e−ρtL(Θ¯t, lt)dt+ e
−ρτT v(Θ¯τT )
]
≤
( ε
ρ
− δ
)
P{τT < T}+ (ε
ρ
+ ε)e−ρT + v(¯x)− ε
ρ
≤
( ε
ρ
+ ε
)
e−ρT + v(¯x)− ε
ρ
.
Here in the last inequality above we used the fact that ε/ρ − δ < 0, by definition of ε. Letting
T →∞ we have
E
[ ∫ τT
0
e−ρtL(Θ¯t, lt)dt+ e
−ρτT v(Θ¯τT )
]
≤ v(¯x)− ε
ρ
.
Since l ∈ Uad is arbitrary, this contradicts the dynamic programming principle (5.4).
The proof that v is viscosity supersolution of (6.1) is more or less standard, again with the
help of Itoˆ’s formula (2.18). We only give a sketch here.
Let ¯x ∈ D and ϕ ∈ U (¯x). Without loss of generality we assume that 0 = v(¯x) − ϕ(¯x) is a
global minimum. That is, v(x) − ϕ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ D . For any h > 0 and l ∈ Uad, we apply
DPP (5.4) to get
0 ≥ E
[ ∫ h
0
e−ρtL(Θt, lt)dt+ e
−ρhv(Θh)
]
− v(x)
≥ E
[ ∫ h
0
e−ρtL(Θt, lt)dt+ e
−ρhϕ(Θh)
]
− ϕ(x). (6.10)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−ρtϕ(Θt) from 0 to h we have
0 ≥ E
[ ∫ h
0
e−ρt
(
L(Θt, lt) +J
lϕ(Θt)− ρϕ(Θt)
)
dt
]
. (6.11)
Dividing both sides by h and sending h to 0, we obtain ρϕ(x, q,Pξ) ≥ J lϕ(x, q,Pξ) +
L(x, q,Pξ, l). By taking supremum over l ∈ Uad on both sides, we conclude
ρϕ(x, q,Pξ) ≥ sup
l∈Uad
[J lϕ(x, q,Pξ) + L(x, q,Pξ, l)].
The proof is now complete.
7 A Final Remark
It is worth mentioning that the result of this paper can be connected to that of [33] in the
following way. First, note that the value function v(x, q,Pξ) in (4.16) is the discounted lifelong
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expected utility of a “representative seller”, as the limiting case of a Bertrand-type of game for a
large number of sellers. We shall thus consider the value function of the control problem for the
representative seller as the “equilibrium” discounted expected utility for every seller. Moreover,
as one can see in Proposition 5.1, the value function v(x, q,Pξ) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous,
non-decreasing in x, and decreasing in q. Also, by Assumption 4.2-(vii), the value function is
convex in q. Consequently, we see that the value function v(x, q,Pξ) resembles the expected utility
function U(x, q) in [33] which was defined by the following properties:
(i) the mapping x 7→ U(x, q) is non-decreasing, and ∂U(x,q)∂q < 0, ∂
2U(x,q)
∂q2
> 0;
(ii) the mapping (x, q) 7→ U(x, q) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous.
In particular, we may identify the two functions by setting U(x, q) = v(x, q,Pξ)|ξ≡q, which
amounts to saying that the equilibrium density function of a limit order book is fully described
by the value function of a control problem of the representing seller’s Bertrand-type game. This
would enhance the notion of “endogenous dynamic equilibrium limit order book model” of [33] in
a rather significant way.
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